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TORTS 
Ralph Michael Stein* 
While the last several years have witnessed significant change 
in the field of tort law, viewed as advancement by some and regres- 
sion by others, 1985 was a relatively stable year, a t  least in the 
courtroom. With a sometimes real, sometimes imagined, crisis in 
the liability insurance field, the drive to change, reform, improve, 
and re-package the law of civil wrongs has been in full swing. A 
myriad of legislative proposals followed a continued public debate, 
fueled by high pressure advertising campaigns, about the societal 
cost of the common law tort system. Local governments threatened 
to close parks and police departments; doctors issued their peren- 
nial warnings about the looming shortage of practitioners, all of 
the good ones supposedly having flown away to low-litigation areas. 
The enactment of some measures, whether reform or not, wil l  af- 
fect tort practice in this state during the coming Survey year. The 
changes wrought will be examined in next year's Survey. 
A. Informed Consent 
Physicians sued for malpractice frequently attempt to offset a 
possible heavy jury award by seeking to establish the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff. If successful, the defendant-physician 
may reduce significantly the amount of damages awarded under 
the New York comparative negligence statute.' The question 
whether New York's pure comparative negligence statute applies 
to causes of action based on lack of informed consenta mas dis- 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author is a co-author 
of CO~WARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (Matthew Bender 1984), and he frequently lectures on medical, 
psychiatric, and nursing malpractice law. 
1. See N.Y. CPLR 1411 (McKinney 1976) 
2. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 3 2805-d(1) (hIcKinney 1985) provides: 
Lack of informed consent means the failure of the person providing profmionnl 
treatment or diagnosis to disclose to the patient such alternatives thereto and the 
reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a reasonnble medical pmcti- 
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cussed in Bellier v. B a ~ a n . ~  In Bellier, the plaintiff had undergone 
a breast reduction procedure, essentially a cosmetic operation: 
from which resulted, so the plaintiff claimed, "severe and unneces- 
sary scarring and disc~mfort."~ The plaintiff alleged both a failure 
to obtain informed consent and medical malpracti~e.~ The issue of 
the plaintiffs comparative negligence was put to the jury solely on 
the medical malpractice cause of action. The jury, however, re- 
sponding on a verdict sheet, found the defendant to be liable on 
both causes of action, and also found the plaintiff to be contribu- 
torily negligent.' The defendant's motion to set aside the medical 
malpractice verdict was granted.8 
The plaintiff moved to set aside the jury's finding that, on the 
informed consent cause of action, she was responsible for fifteen 
percent of the $356,000 of  damage^.^ She contended that "compar- 
ative fault cannot be used as a defense in an action sounding in 
lack of an informed consent,"1° and that, "even assuming that the 
doctrine can be applied, no evidence in the instant case supports 
it.7911 
The trial court agreed that the defendant simply had failed to 
meet his burden of presenting evidence of the plaintiffs contribu- 
tory negligence with reference to the lack of informed consent.12 Of 
greater interest, however, is the court's succinct disposition of the 
plaintiffs claim that New York's comparative negligence concept is 
inapplicable to informed consent actions. Noting that the informed 
consent cause of action is "a form of medical malpractice,"13 the 
court found that "[tlhe doctrine of mitigation of damages, availa- 
ble as a defense to other forms of medical malpractice, should, 
therefore, properly apply to a cause of action for lack of informed 
tioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed, in a manner permitting 
the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation. 
Id. 
3. 124 Misc. 2d 1055, 478 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1984). 
4. See id. at 1056, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 563. 
5. See id. 
6. See id. at 1055-56, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 563. 
7. See id. 
8. See id. at 1056, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 563-64. 
9. See id. at 1056, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 564. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. See id. at 1058, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 564. 
13. Id. at 1056, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 564. 
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 ons sent.^"^ 
What the law calls contributory negligence, physicians usually 
call "patient non~ompliance."'~ While specific defenses are pro- 
vided for by New York's informed consent statute, contributory 
negligence is not one of them.16 As the court noted in Bellier, how- 
ever, proper analysis of New York law demonstrates that the doc- 
trine is fully applicable.'? Factual analysis of lack of informed con- 
sent causes of action, especially when they are not accompanied by 
allegations of medical malpractice, may indicate the potential use- 
fulness of contributory negligence to diminish a plainWs 
recovery. 
The Appellate Division, First Department, decided a com- 
bined medical malpracticelfailure to obtain informed consent case 
during the Survey year. In Suria v. Shiffman,'8 the plaintiff, a 
transsexual, underwent a breast procedure which resulted in vari- 
ous unsightly and unpleasant after-effects. A surgical procedure 
was recommended to alleviate the iatrogenic complications of 
Suria's initial encounter with one of the  defendant^.'^ More medi- 
cal problems followed.20 One of the defendants was found to have 
committed malpractice whiie another was found to have failed in 
his duty to obtain informed consent?' It is unfortunate that the 
First Department did no more than mention that the latter de- 
fendant altered the informed consent form, after it had been exe- 
cuted, to reflect an acknowledgment by the patient that he was 
consenting to a more extensive and invasive procedure.22 One won- 
14. Id. In all probability, a claim by a defendant of contributory negligence in a medical 
malpractice case will be most likely to succeed when the physicinn had provided enough 
information so as to permit some exercise of reasonable decision-making by the patient The 
level at  which a patient can fail to exercise due care for hisher own life in nn informed 
consent situation may be at  a point below that at  which a physician will be found to have 
reasonably discharged the informed consent duty. 
15. Patient non-compliance can include acts of both omission and commission. Each 
type of failure to follow reasonable instructions can, of course, lead to n subtnntinl hnrm to 
the patient. 
16. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 5 28054 (hlcKinney 1985). 
17. See Bellier, 124 Misc 2d at  1058, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t  564. 
18. Suria v. S h i i a n ,  107 kD.2d 309,486 N.Y.S.2d 724 ( k t  Dep't 1985). 
19. See id. a t  310,486 N.Y.S.2d at  725. 
20. See id. 
21. See id. at  311, 486 N.Y.S.2d at  726. 
22. See id. a t  311, 486 N.Y.S.2d at  725. The consent form stated thnt the plnintiff 
would only have a small scar on his chest. One of the defendants chnnged the form without 
notifying the plaintiff. See id. 
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ders if the patient, a transsexual, was treated with the profession- 
alism and seriousness with which the defendants would have ap- 
proached other patients. In any event, the appellate panel was 
clearly correct in reducing the plaintiffs award to $800,000 from 
the $2 million originally awarded.23 Such verdicts only serve to 
continue to fan the "tort law reform" fires in this state. 
B. Mental Distress 
The nature of medical treatment, even the presence of non- 
patients in a medical facility, creates recurring fact patterns in 
which individuals who may not be patients themselves sustain 
emotional harm in the absence of any actual physical injury or ag- 
gravation of an existing condition. New York has recently begun to 
enlarge the concept of negligent infliction of mental distress and 
plaintiffs are seeking to bring actions within the sheltering scope of 
Bovsun v. S~nper i .~ '  Two cases decided during the Survey year, 
each involving institutional or individual health-sector defendants, 
provide some insight into the direction of this developing area of 
tort law.26 
Of major importance is the Court of Appeals decision in John- 
son v. Jamaica H o ~ p i t a l . ~ ~  Mentioned in last year's Survey arti- 
cle:' Johnson involved a tragic situation. The plaintiffs' newborn 
infant was abducted from the defendant's hospital and was not 
found by the police for over four months.28 The plaintiffs' brought 
an action for what they perceived as the defendant's negligent in- 
23. See id. a t  314-15, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t  727-28. Multi-million dollar medical malpractice 
awards in cases where there is no death and no permanent vocation-disabling injuries are 
almost always predicated on a jury's sympathy for the plaintiffs pain and suffering. Such 
awards may also be, even if not so denominated, exemplary damage awards. Such awards, 
when sustained, often constitute the basis for the major part of a plaintiff counsel's 
renumeration. These awards are difficult to defend on any rational basis and a statutory 
ceiling on pain and suffering awards in all tort actions will alleviate some of tho economic 
problems which seem to feed the current liability crisis nationwide. 
24. 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984) (where defendant nogli- 
gently creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, and such negligence is a substantial 
factor of resulting physical injuries, the immediate family of the injured person, if within 
the zone of danger, may recover damages under the theory of negligent infliction of emo- 
tional distress). 
25. See Johnson v. Jamaica Hospital, 62 N.Y.2d 523,467 N.E.2d 502,478 N.Y.S.2d 838 
(1984); Tebbutt v. Virostek, 102 A.D.2d 231, 477 N.Y.S.2d 776 (3d Dep't 1984). 
26. 62 N.Y.2d 523, 467 N.E.2d 502,478 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1984). 
27. See Stein, Torts, 1984 Survey of N.Y. Law, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 595, 620 (1985). 
28. See Johnson, 62 N.Y.2d a t  525, 467 N.E.2d a t  502, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t  838. 
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fliction of mental distress.2B A motion to dismiss the complaint by 
the defendant hospital was denied by the trial court.gO A divided 
Second Department panel aflirmed Special Term and the case was 
certified to the Court of Appeals.g1 For reasons which I find highly 
unpersua~ive,3~ the State's highest court reversed, dismissing the 
complaint.33 
In an opinion authored by Judge Kaye, the Court noted that 
the plaintiffs do not come under the recently announced Bovsun 
rule34 because the parents of the abducted girl "have not alleged 
that they were within the zone of danger and that their injuries 
resulted from contemporaneous observation of serious physical in- 
jury or death caused by defendant's negligen~e."~~ 
Citing the always-available prime duty case, Palsgraf u. Long 
Island Railroad,s6 the Court of Appeals noted that if any duty was 
breached, i t  was to the abducted infant and not to the parents.37 
The Court's reasoning relied heavily on Kalina a General Hospi- 
taLs8 It is unfortunate that the analytical underpinning for the ma- 
jority's analysis of duty is based on a case concerning a botched 
ci rcumci~ion~~ hardly a parallel in kind or degree with kidnapping, 
a crime that arouses universal revulsion and involves unquestioned 
psychic trauma for parents. 
The Court of Appeals also rejected predicating liability on ei- 
29. See id. 
30. See id. 
31. See id. 
32. See infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text 
33. See Johnson, 62 N.Y.2d a t  537-38, 467 N.E.2d a t  510,478 N.YS.2d nt 846. 
34. See supra note 24. 
35. Johnson, 62 N.Y.2d a t  526, 467 N.E.2d a t  503, 478 N.Y.S.2d nt 839. Judge Knye 
continued: 
Plaintiffs contend . . . that their complaint states a cause of action bemuse the 
defendant hospital owed a duty directly to them, as parents, to care properly for 
their child, and that it was or should have been forseeable to defendant thnt any 
injury to Kawana, such as abduction, would cause them mental distress There is no 
basis for establishing such a direct duty. This court has refused to recognize such a 
duty on the part of a hospital to the parents of hospitalized children. . . nod there 
is no reason to depart from that rule here. 
Id. at 526-27,467 N.E.2d a t  503,478 N.Y.S.2d a t  839 (citing Kaling v. Geneml Hospital. 13 
N.Y.2d 1023, 195 N.E.2d 309, 245 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1963)). 
36. 248 N.Y.2d 339, 162 N.E.2d 99 (1928). 
37. See Johnson, 62 N.Y.2d a t  527,467 N.E.2d a t  503,478 N.YS.2d a t  839. 
38: 13 N.Y.2d 1023, 195 N.E.2d 309.245 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1963). 
39. See id. . - 
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ther in loco parentis40 or contractual grounds41 The Court's analy- 
sis of the in loco parentis argument is technically correct, but is 
essentially tangential to the real issue: the predication of liability 
based on a straight common law negligence, duty analysis. 
Towards the end of the majority's opinion, an old rationale for 
denying the existence of a cause of action slips past in a short but 
familiar sentence: "In considering a new duty, the court's concern 
for its ramifying consequences should hardly be di~paraged."~~ 
There it  is, gentle reader, the judicial specter of a horde of suitors 
rushing to claim their compensation for their abducted children 
with the resultant clogging of the courts. 
In his cogent dissent, Judge Meyer tackled the just-referred-to 
shibboleth head-on. "I had thought that the fear of 'open-ended 
liability for indirect emotional injury' . . . had long ago been laid to 
rest."43 Apparently not. Judge Meyer correctly noted that Bovsun 
did not prevent recognizing the cause of action raised by the plain- 
tiffs in Johnson: 
In my view the parental weight to custody is sufficiently distinct 
from physical injury to or death of a child, the class of persons 
permitted to recover sufficiently limited, and the psychological 
trauma to the parents resulting from infringement of their custo- 
dial rights is direct rather than consequential and sufficiently 
probable in human experience that they should be permitted to 
recover upon proof of a serious and verifiable emotional 
disturbance." 
With reference to the duty issue, Judge Meyer noted that, 
"[tlhe policy determination to be made may be stated as whether 
the interests of plaintiffs and defendant and the relationship be- 
tween them are such that defendant rather than plaintiffs should 
be required to bear the burden of plaintiffs' psychic injury."46 
Judge Meyer examined the record and found that no undue bur- 
den would be placed on the defendant hospital if this cause of ac- 
tion was allowed because the exercise of reasonable care towards 
40. The literal interpretation of in loco parentis is "in place of the parent." 
41. See Johnson, 62 N.Y.2d at 528, 467 N.E.2d at 504, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 840-41. 
42. Id. at 531, 467 N.E.2d at 506, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 842. 
43. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting) (citing Battala v. New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 
729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961)). 
44. Id. at 533, 467 N.E.2d at 507, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
45. Id. at 533, 467 N.E.2d at 507, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 844 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
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the infant would also be the basis for fkding a breach of the 
claimed duty asserted by the ~arents. '~ 
Although I f h d  Judge Meyer's approach to the duty issue to 
be analytically stronger than the majority's treatment of this piv- 
otal concept, it is interesting that neither majority nor dissent 
raised, let alone discussed, key public policy concerns. Any jurist 
in this country today may, without criticism, take judicial notice of 
the fact that the American public is somewhat preoccupied with 
the real or imagined epidemic of missing children, a large number 
of whom have been abducted criminally. The faces of missing chil- 
dren are found in public utility bills, on milk containers and pos- 
ters that seem to be everywhere. That dealing with the phenome- 
non of missing children is a national priority is beyond dispute. 
Part of the national awareness campaign concerning missing chil- 
dren has been the highlighting of the intense anguish of parents. 
The social reality of the missing children issue is a model for ad- 
vancing common law duty concepts to better deal with a newly rec- 
ognized issue. Tort law has a prophylactic function in helping to 
establish standards of reasonable behavior so as to prevent future 
and additional harms. Imposing a duty upon a hospital to safe- 
guard helpless babies from abductors with the duty running to the 
parents who suffer, in some instances, such as Johnson, the only 
measurable harm, wil l  demonstrate the continued rational vitality 
and relevance of the common law, while affording some measure of 
compensation for great emotional distress. 
In Tebbutt v. Viro~tek,'~ the Third Department afbmed a 
summary judgment dismissing a complaint predicated on emo- 
tional stress to a woman caused by the stillbirth of her fetus. The 
46. See id. a t  534, 467 N.E.2d a t  508, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t  844. Apparently the Johnson 
baby, recovered by the police, was unharmed physically and hnd not been mistreated emo- 
tionally. A cause of action on behalf of the infant for actual physical or emotionnl injuries, 
had they occurred, is well-grounded in New York law. If such an action rios brought a g h t  
the hospital, it would be difficult for the hospital to seriously daim thnt they owed the baby 
no duty to safeguard her from being feloniously spirited from the premises. The breach of 
that duty, to be proven by the plaintiff, is exactly the same breach of care claimed by the 
baby's parents in the instant case. Recognizing the plaintiffs' negligent infliction of mental 
distress cause of action in this case would not have resulted in the imposition of n new and 
socially unacceptable burden upon this or any other health facility. Even if one accepts the 
prevailing majority concern of the Court of Appeals that causes of action for negligent inflic- 
tion of mental distress must be accepted slowly if a t  all, the Johnson sce-o is itself a 
readily "controlled" or encapsulated problem opening no new doors to futum litigants 
47. 102 kD.2d 231,477 N.Y.S.2d 776 (3rd Dep't 1984). 
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stillbirth was alleged to be a result of the negligence of the defend- 
ant do~tor . '~  The patient based her cause of action on Bovsun v. 
S ~ n p i e r i . ~ ~  As Justice Main noted, Tebbutt lacked the Bovsun re- 
quirements of either observation of harm inflicted, or a contempo- 
raneous awareness of the situation.60 
The court also noted that predicating liability upon the theory 
of an injury done to the fetus was untenable under current New 
York law.61 New York law holds that "a child en ventre sa mere is 
not considered a person unless it sees the light of day."62 The ap- 
pellate court concluded that "it is conceptually difficult to say that 
plaintiffs emotional distress is incidental to the physical injury of 
a third person, the unborn child who never saw the light of day."o8 
Given the amount of litigation involving injury or death to fetuses, 
it is likely that the issues raised in this case will be before the 
Court of Appeals within the next few terms of court. 
Several other cases decided during the Survey year concerning 
medical malpractice are worth brief mention. Needham v. County 
of Nassau5' concerned the appealability of an order denying a mo- 
tion to vacate the findings of a medical malpractice panel.OThe 
Second Department, relying on legislative intent, found that there 
is no appeal as of right in such circ~mstances.~~ 
Two cases demonstrated the difficulty juries have in grappling 
with the complex factual testimony in medical malpractice cases. 
In Tiernan v. Hein~en,~'  the Second Department affirmed a ver- 
dict for the plaintiff in a breast cancer malpractice case, but re- 
48. See id. 
49. See id. a t  231, 477 N.Y.S.2d a t  777. 
50. See id. a t  232, 477 N.Y.S.2d a t  777. 
51. See id. 
52. See id. a t  232, 477 N.Y.S.2d a t  777-78. Justice Maim opined: 
In this case, plaintiff did not become aware of any problem with the fetus for sov- 
era1 weeks after the alleged negligence of defendant. Thus, there was no contempo- 
raneous observation or instantaneous awareness of injury or death and, even if tho 
other elements of the Bovsun rule were satisfied, the failure on this aspect prevents 
plaintiff from recovery thereunder. A more expansive interpretation of "contempo- 
raneous observation" should come not from us, but from the Court of Appeals. 
Id. 
53. Id. a t  233, 477 N.Y.S.2d a t  778. 
54. 109 A.D.2d 783,486 N.Y.S.2d 91 (2d Dep't 1985). 
55. For more information, see N.Y. JUD. LAW 3 148(a) (McKinney 1983). 
56. See id. 
57. 104 A.D.2d 645, 480 N.Y.S.2d 24 (2d Dep't 1984). 
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duced as extremely excessive a jury verdict of $1.5 millionP8 Of 
interest is Justice Titone's dissent in which he pointed out that the 
jury's verdict as to the several defendants was inconsistent and un- 
supported by the record.6B 
What must have been an even more dficult case for the trial 
court was Mertsaris v. 73rd C ~ r p . ~ ~  The Second Department, af- 
firming in part and reversing in part, ordered a new trial in a medi- 
cal malpractice setting where the plaintiffs had alleged that se- 
quential acts of professional negligence resulted in the birth of a 
baby with permanent, disabling athetoid cerebral palsy?' The 
court provided clear guidelines for the new trial to prevent the 
problems encountered on appeal.e2 Considering, however, that a $7 
million verdict was reached at the first trial, i t  is doubtful if the 
defendants will actually accept a second trial.es Justice O'Connor's 
opinion, well-written and convincing, is an excellent depiction of 
the evidentiary quagmire of a major medical malpractice action. 
A. General 
The line between a cause of action properly denominated as 
negligent supervision of a child, and negligence as to the child, is 
the subject of many motions each year. New York law rejects the 
former concept while recognizing the latter as ac t i~nable .~  In
Malin v. Malin,s6 Justice Fudeman denied the defendant's motion 
for summary judgment. The infant plaintiff was injured by an un- 
attended family car.0e The defendant mother tried to invoke 
Holodook v. Spencer,s7 which prohibits actions based on alleged 
58. See id. a t  648,480 N.Y.S.2d a t  26. 
59. See id. a t  648, 480 N.Y.S.2d a t  27 (Titone, J., dissenting). 
60. 105 kD.2d 67, 482 N.Y.S.2d 792 (2d Depst 1984). 
61. See id. a t  69-73, 482 N.Y.S.2d a t  79496. 
62. See id. a t  88, 482 N.Y.S.2d a t  806. 
63. See id. a t  69, 482 N.Y.S.2d a t  794. 
64. See Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35,50,324 N.E.2d 338,346,364 N.YS.2d 859, 
871 (1974). 
65. 124 Misc 2d 1078,478 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (Sup. Ct, Erie Co. 1984). 
66. See id. 
67. 36 N.Y.2d 35,324 N.E.2d 338,364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974). In Holodook, a four-year- 
old jumped out between two parked cars and was struck by the defendant's vehicle. The 
infant, by his father, sued the defendant for personal injuries. The defendant then brought 
a third-party action against the infant's mother for negligently failing to perform her paren- 
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breaches of a standard of conduct peculiarly associated with child- 
rearing.6s The Erie County juries found that "[tlhe duty of the de- 
fendant to park carefully was owed to the world at large; and de- 
rived from the parties' relation as driver and pedestrian. The fact 
that the parties were mother and son was irrelevant to both the 
duty and a determination of its breach."6D New York law has con- 
sistently refused to find a cause of action based on what would be, 
in essence, negligent parenting.?O While the doctrine of in- 
trafamilial immunity, with regard to actions brought against par- 
ents by minors has been modified, it has not been ab~lished.~' 
Although the existence and nature of physical harm is gener- 
ally a question of fact for the jury, an issue of law may arise when 
a plaintiff seeks damages outside the scope of New York's so-called 
No-Fault Law.72 In Bader v. S~ntana, '~  the Fourth Department 
reversed a $60,000 award for the plaintiff finding, as a matter of 
law, that he had not sustained a serious injury (as statutorily re- 
quired) to permit recovery in a tort action.74 Although plaintiff 
Bader undoubtedly, in the view of the court, sustained a painful 
injury, it was not a serious injury entitling the plaintiff to a jury 
determinati~n.?~ 
While the trend in the law of damages in New York has re- 
cently seen many appellate remittiturs, a case decided by the 
Fourth Department reflects judicial wisdom and compassion in re- 
storing a jury verdict of $500,000 after the trial court ordered a 
new trial unless the plaintiff accepted $30,000.76 In Bartolone v. 
Jecko~ich,'~ the plaintiff, a middle-aged carpenter and physical fit- 
tal duty to provide for the proper care, maintenance and supervision of the child. Tho Court 
dismissed the claim, finding that New York would not recognize a third-party action basod 
on negligent parental supervision. 
68. See Malin, 124 Misc. 2d a t  1079, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t  1012. 
69. Id. 
70. See Holodook, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859. Although tho 
Holodook Court held that actions based upon negligent parental supervision are not main- 
tainable, the Court did note that actions maintainable apart from the family relation would 
not be withheld because the parties were parent and child. See id. at  50,324 N.E.2d at  346, 
364 N.Y.S.2d a t  871. 
71. See id. 
72. N.Y. INS. LAW 5 5221 (McKinney 1985). 
73. 106 A.D.2d 858, 483 N.Y.S.2d 143 (4th Dep't 1984). 
74. See N.Y. INS. LAW 3 5221 (McKinney 1985). 
75. See Bader, 106 A.D.2d a t  859, 483 N.Y.S.2d a t  144. 
76. See Bartolone v. Jeckovich, 103 A.D.2d 632,481 N.Y.S.2d 545 (4th Dep't 1984). 
77. 103 A.D.2d 632, 481 N.Y.S.2d 545 (4th Dep't 1984). 
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ness enthusiast, sustained minor injuries in a car collision caused 
by the defendants' negligen~e.?~ Following the accident, the plain- 
tiff became psychotic and dysfunctional, a condition described by 
his expert witness as irrever~ible.~~ The trial court ordered a new 
trial unless the plaintiff accepted $30,000, based on its determina- 
tion "that there was no basis on which the jury could conclude that 
plaintiffs total mental breakdown could be attributed to a minor 
accident."80 Such an order was illogical for, if the trial court so be- 
lieved, i t  was obligated to enter judgment notwithstanding the ver- 
dict, not to offer a compromise. 
The appellate court found ample proof in the record to sup- 
port the jury's verdict.81 Although the plaintiff, not surprisingly, 
had a past history of mental problems, "[tlhe circumstances of 
[the] case before us illustrate[s] the truth of the old axiom that a 
defendant must take a plaintiff as he finds him and hence may be 
held liabli in damages for aggravation of a pre-existing illness."s2 
Although the appellate court restated a long-accepted princi- 
ple, the generally greater acceptance of psychiatry and the in- 
creased availability of therapy indicate that defenses based on the 
8 existence of a previously diagnosed mental condition mill be more 
common. Plaintiffs' counsel and judges share a responsibility to in- 
sure that a prior history of mental disease does not serve to wipe 
out claims for aggravated harm initiated by a negligent defendant's 
actions. 
Proximate cause remains a diicult  concept for definition and 
application. In a negligence case based on an alleged violation of a 
statute, Dowling v. Consolidated Carriers C0rp.,8~ the First De- 
partment explored the proximate cause problem. In reversing the 
dismissal of an injured truck passenger's complaint, the appellate 
court noted that the trial court had misrelied on an inapposite 
case.84 Citing the opinion of Mr. Justice Hopkins, one of the great- 
est jurists in recent New York history, the appellate panel in Dow- 
ling found a close relationship between the defendant's violation of 
78. See id. at 632,481 N.Y.S.2d at 546. 
79. See id. at 633,481 N.Y.S.2d at 546. 
80. Id. at 634, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 546. 
81. See id. at 635,481 N.Y.S.2d at 547. 
82. Id. (citing Malahill v. New York Tramp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 223-24 (1911)). 
83. 103 A.D.2d 675,478 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1st Dep't 1984), a f d ,  65 N.Y.2d 799,482 NE2d 
912, 493 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1985). 
84. See id. at 677,478 N.Y.S.2d at 885. 
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a statute and the subsequent incident which resulted in harm to 
the  lai in tiff.^^ The discussion of foreseeability in Dowling is 
excellent. 
New York courts have resisted attempts to weaken Worker's 
Compensation as the main, and generally exclusive, remedys0 of 
the injured employees. Each year attempts are made to breach the 
barrier of the exclusive remedy. In Bardere v. Zafir,87 the First De- 
partment affirmed the dismissal of an injured employee's claim in 
tort against his employer. The plaintiff tried to bring his cause of 
action within the scope of intentional torts, an area outside the 
purview of Worker's Compensation, by showing that the employer 
had modified a machine, knowing that it would be hazardous to 
 employee^.^^ Justice Fein analyzed the plaintiffs claim and found 
that he was essentially pleading gross negligence rather than inten- 
tional tort.sB The remedy for gross negligence is Worker's 
Compensation. 
Tort litigation against landlords is increasingly common, with 
new theories of duty being propounded each year. One such theory 
was rejected by Justice Tenney in Onondaga County in Georgi- 
anna v. Giz~y .~O In Georgianna, the plaintiffs infant son was bit- 
ten by a dog which had previously bitten another person.D1 The 
special twist to this case was the plaintiffs contention that in the 
absence of actual knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities, 
which the defendant admittedly lacked, constructive knowledge 
was sufficient to find liability.92 Constructive knowledge in this in- 
stance, according to the plaintiff, was a report filed with the local 
85. See id. Justice Hopkins, sitting on the Second Department bench, commented that, 
"the definition of proximate cause has been elusive, probably because the public policy un. 
derlying the concept cannot be described other than in general terms." Pagan v. Goldborgor, 
51 A.D.2d 508,509,382 N.Y.S.2d 549,551 (1976). Most law students would agree with Jus. 
tice Hopkins. 
86. See N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW 5 11 (McKinney 1985). 
87. 102 A.D.2d 422,477 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1st Dep't), aff'd,  63 N.Y.2d 850,472 N.E.2d 37, 
482 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1984). 
88. See id. a t  423, 477 N.Y.S.2d a t  133. 
89. See id. a t  424, 477 N.Y.S.2d a t  134. 
90. 126 Misc. 2d 766, 483 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co. 1984). 
91. See id. a t  766, 483 N.Y.S.2d a t  893. One reason why many landlords do not want 
their tenants to harbor dogs is that the landlords may be liable if a dog known to them to bo 
vicious bites someone. See id. (citing Zwinge v. Love, 37 A.D.2d 874,325 N.YaS.2d 107 (3d 
Dep't 1971)). 
92. See id. 
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town and county of the previous biting incident.O3 The court re- 
jected this theory finding that the defendant landlord had no duty 
to search for governmental reports and documents, noting that 
"[sluch a burden would be oppressive and unreasonable."* 
A Second Department case featured a strong "pro-dog" dis- 
senting opinion by Justice Mangano.B5 The alleged culprit in this 
rear-end auto collision was the defendant's nine-year old, twenty- 
five pound Scotch terrier. A jury verdict in favor of the defendant 
was reversed by the appellate majority.Be The jury had accepted 
the defendant's evidence that the dog, who had "never budged" in 
the past, jumped off the seat and onto the gas pedal, thus dislodg- 
ing the defendant's foot from the brake.B7 As the dissent noted, the 
majority found that, as a matter of law, the defendant was negli- 
gent.98 Justice Mangano found that the cases relied on by the ma- 
jority for finding a matter-of-law liability were inapposite to the / - 
unique facts in Conyer u. Vinti.BB Justice Mangano viewed the re- 
versal of the jury's verdict as "an affront to that particular species 
of the animal kingdom, i.e., the tame dog 'which the law, guided by 
experience, has always regarded as the friend and companion of 
man.' "'00 
B. State and Municipal Entities 
An area of concern for law enforcement officers nationwide are 
lawsuits based on injuries sustained during the "hot pursuit" of 
actual or suspected offenders. Two such cases were before the 
Third Department during the Survey year.lO' In Rightmeyer v. 
State,lo2 the plaintiff was fleeing a state trooper who sought to 
93. See id. 
94. Id. a t  767, 483 N.Y.S.2d a t  894. 
95. See Conyers v. Vinti, 107 A.D.2d 787,484 N.Y.S.2d 620 (2d Dep't 1985) (himgmo. 
J., dissenting). 
96. See id..at 789, 484 N.Y.S.2d a t  622. 
97. See id. at  788,484 N.Y.S.2d a t  621. 
98. See id. at  790, 484 N.Y.S.2d a t  623. 
99. See id. The majority relied on cases in which the defendant hnd acted &matively 
with the collision occurring subsequently. See, e.g., Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 N.Y.2d 361,320 
N.E.2d 853,362 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1974). In Conyers the defendant was acted upon by her dog. 
100. Conyers, 107 kD.2d a t  790, 484 N.Y.S.2d a t  623 (citing Kennett v. Smnitz, 260 
kD.2d 759, 761,23 N.Y.S.2d 961, 962 (1940). alf'd, 286 N.Y. 623,36 N.E2d 459 (1941). 
101. See Rightmeyer v. State, 108 A.D.2d 1047, 486 N.Y.S.2d 99 (3d Dep't 1985); 
Mitchell v. State, 108 A.D.2d 1033, 486 N.Y.S.2d 97 (3d Dep't 1985). 
102. 108 A.D.2d 1047,486 N.Y.S.2d 99 (3d Dep't 1085). 
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question him after observing that the plaintiffs vehicle inspection 
sticker had expired.lo3 The trooper was using his siren and emer- 
gency lights. The plaintips car collided with a tree as he tried to 
evade the trooper and the plaintiff incurred severe injuries.'04 The 
Third Department affirmed the Court of Claims' summary judg- 
ment in favor of the State.lo6 
In Mitchell v. State,lo6 the plaintiff collided with a reckless 
driver who was being pursued by a state trooper.lo7 Unlike the 
facts in Rightmyer, the trooper in Mitchell was in violation of de- 
partmental regulation~ as he was not using his siren and emer- 
gency lights during the pursuit.'08 The Court of Claims, however, 
found that the failure of the trooper to follow proper procedures 
was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.'OO The Third 
Department affirmed the Court of Claims' dismissal of the claim."0 
Tort actions sounding in assault and battery against police of- 
ficers, and their respective governments, by persons arrested for 
crimes are increasingly common. Arnold v. Statell' involved inju- 
ries largely caused by a pre-existing, but not obvious, physical con- 
dition when the plaintiff was wrestled to the ground by state 
troopers.l12 The troopers had a warrant for the subject's arrest, 
and according to the troopers, he refused to go with themeu3 The 
troopers had also received reports that Arnold had weapons on or 
near him.l14 The Court of Claims dismissed the plaintiffs claim 
and the Third Department affirmed."6 
Presiding Justice Mahoney's dissent is disturbing because he, 
in effect, attempted to second guess the officers' decision to use 
force without bringing to light any relevant facts not considered by 
103. See id. at 1047, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 100. 
104. See id. at 1048, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 100. 
105. See id. at  1047, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 100. 
106. 108 A.D.2d 1033, 486 N.Y.S.2d 97 (3d Dep't 1985). 
107. See id. at 1033, 486 N.Y.S.2d at  98. 
108. See id. at 1034,486 N.Y.S.2d at  99. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. 
111. 108 A.D.2d 1021, 486 N.Y.S.2d 94 (3d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 65 N.Y.2d 722, 
481 N.E.2d 569, 492 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1985). 
112. See id. 
113. See id. at 1022, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 95. 
114. See id. at  1023, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 96. 
115. See id. 
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the majority.lle That the plaintiff was being arrested for an offense 
that was "nonviolent and relatively minorwn7 is only one factor 
which the arresting officers were confronted with a t  the sceneF8 
The dissent emphasizes the seriousness of the injury, produced be- 
cause of a pre-existing condition, and ignores the effect of the re- 
port of firearms.l19 Justice Mahoney would have the police engage 
in excessive and impracticable hair-splitting which might well in- 
crease the likelihood of serious violence a t  an arrest scene.120 
The Third Department also upheld a Court of Claims award 
of $75,000 to a former prison inmate who suffered permanent inju- 
ries to his left arm when his arm became ensnared in a "bread 
proofing" machine.121 Based on the plaintiff's impaired earning 
ability, the appellate court found that the amount awarded mas not 
excessive.122 
In an action against the State of New York under New York's 
strict liability labor statute concerning s~afTolding,'*~ the Second 
Department upheld an award of $525,000 on behalf of the claim- 
116. See id. (Mahoney, J., dissenting). 
117. See id. a t  1024,486 N.Y.S.2d a t  96. 
118. See id. a t  1025,486 N.Y.S.2d a t  97. Adjunct Professor of Criminnl Justice, Donnld 
Singer of Mercy College, was interviewed in connection with the d p i s  of this case. 
Singer, an attorney, is Chief of the Greenburgh (N.Y.) Police Department nnd he is a highly 
regarded authority on modem police practices. Singer stated: 
The decision to physically restrain an uncooperative subject must be mnde with 
little time for reflection. Generally, restraint does not result in nny real in juy to 
anyone. While the knowledge that a subject is suspected of a violent or serious 
crime serves to put arresting officers on their guard, the fact thnt a wnrrant is k i n g  
executed for a minor crime must not lull the officer into insecurity. h b y  officers 
have been hurt or even killed making arrest. for "minorDD 05emes. The bottom line 
is that you never know for sure what the subject of the arrest is thinking. Some- 
times people accused of relatively minor offenses, people who do not hnve criminnl 
records, become berserk when faced with arrest. We see thnt all the time nith driv- 
ing whiie intoxicated arrests. Professional police officers have a legnl nnd morn1 obli- 
gation not to use excessive force, but they also have the right to be os sofe os o 
police officer making an arrest can be. And that requires mnking quick decisions 
Interview with Donald Singer, Chief of Police, Greenburgh, New York @ec 5,1985) (notes 
on file with author). 
119. See Arnold, 108 A.D.2d a t  1024-25, 486 N.Y.S.2d nt 96-97 @fahoney, J., 
dissenting). 
120. See id. 
121. See Georgiadis v. State, 106 A.D.2d 706, 708, 483 N.YS.2d 153, 755 (4th Dep't 
1984). 
122. See id. a t  709,483 N.Y.S.2d a t  756. 
123. N.Y. LAa LAW 5 240 (McKinney 1965). 
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ant.124 The court found that even though another statute required 
a safety rail only when the scaffolding was more than twenty feet 
high, a proper regard for safety could require a rail on lower scaf- 
f01ding.l~~ The plaintiff was working on a state-owned bridge at  the 
time of 
IV. STRICT LIABILITY 
A. Products Liability 
No doctrinally significant products liability decisions were 
handed down during the Survey year. However, several cases are 
7 worthy of brief notice. 
Perhaps the most interesting products liability case of the 
Survey year is Cooley v. Carter- Wallace, I ~ 2 c . l ~ ~  Plaintiffs husband 
and wife brought this action after the husband was painfully and 
permanently injured by a depilatory cream applied to his genital 
area.128 Cooley applied the cream on the recommendation of a phy- 
sician prior to a vasectomy procedure.lZ9 The plaintiffs action al- 
leged inadequacy of the product warning, not its absence. Justice 
Tenney, sitting in the Supreme Court, Onondaga County, granted 
summary judgment on the motion of the defendant manufacturer. 
Justice Tenney, in effect, found that the warning on the product, 
"Nair," was adequate as a matter of law.130 Justice Tenney's judi- 
cial superiors a t  the Fourth Department disagreed and reversed.131 
Inadequate warning actions are among the most difficult in the 
defective products cosmos. As the appellate court in Cooley noted, 
"[ulnlike the often highly technical design or manufacturing defect 
cases, warning cases usually center on a factual determination of 
whether an adequate warning was given."132 While i t  might seem 
from the foregoing words of the court that such cases are in fact 
124. See Kalofonos v. State, 104 A.D.2d 75,481 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2d Dep't 1984). 
125. See id. a t  80, 481 N.Y.S.2d a t  419. 
126. See id. a t  76, 481 N.Y.S.2d a t  416. 
127. 102 A.D.2d 642, 478 N.Y.S.2d 375 (4th Dep't 1984). 
128. See id. a t  643, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t  376. 
129. See id. 
130. See id. a t  648, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t  379. 
131. See id. a t  649, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t  380. 
132. Id. a t  644,478 N.Y.S.2d a t  376. The Cooley court noted that there must first bo a 
duty to warn, which is determined by balancing the seriousness of the potential hnrm to the 
consumer against the cost to the manufacturer. See id. Once a warning is given, tho focus is 
on the adequacy of the warning. See id. 
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easier than their counterparts, the design and manufacture cases, 
this is not so. The import of words, their effect on the consumer, 
their susceptibility to misinterpretation, the balance of the duty to 
warn against the manufacturer's not unreasonable reluctance to 
alarm unduly-these and other factors must be carefully 
considered. 
In Cooley, the warning on the product package specifically 
cautioned against applying the product to genital areas.lS3 How- 
ever, the appellate court noted that the warning, while directing 
that the product not be used in the genital area, did not indicate 
the seriousness of harm which such use could occasion.1s' Only irri- 
tation or allergic reaction were indicated, while plaintiff Cooley 
suffered massive harm.lS6 In addition, the warning was located 
close to the directions on the package. Such location minimized, to 
a certain degree, the impact of the warning.'s6 It is beyond the 
scope of this article to analyze whether the warning on the particu- 
lar product was adequate. It is clear, however, that it  cannot be 
viewed as adequate as a matter of law and that submission to a 
jury is the only proper route.lS7 
- 
133. See id. a t  643, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t  376. The warning read m follow 
WARNING: IRRITATION OR ALLERGIC REACTION h W  OCCUR FViTH 
SOME PEOPLE, EVEN AFTER PRIOR USE WITHOUT ADVERSE EFFECT. 
THEREFORE, TEST BEFORE EACH USE BY APPLYING NAIR ON A SMALL 
PART OF THE AREA WHERE HAIR IS TO BE REMOVED. FOLLOW DIREC- 
TIONS AND WAIT 24 HOURS. IF SKIN APPEARS NORhlAL, PROCEED. DO 
NOT USE ON IRRITATED, INFLAMED, OR BROKEN SKIN. KEEP AWAY 
FROM EYES. SHOULD NAIR TOUCH THE EYES, WASH THOROUGHLY 
WITH LUKEWARM WATER. RINSE WITH BORIC ACID SOLUTION AND IF 
IRRITATION OCCURS, CONSULT YOUR PHYSICIAN. KEEP OUT OF 
REACH OF CHILDREN. NAIR LOTION CAN BE USED ON LEGS, ARMS, 
FACE, ANYWHERE EXCEPT.. . EYES, NOSE, EARS OR ON BREAST NIP- 
PLES, PERIANAL [sic] OR VAGINNAWGENITAL AREAS. 
Id. 
134. See id. a t  648,478 N.Y.S.2d a t  379. 
135. See id. a t  643,478 N.Y.S.2d a t  376. 
136. See id. a t  649,478 N.Y.S.2d a t  379-80. 
137. See id. a t  648,478 N.Y.S.2d a t  379; see also supra note 133. The warning indicates 
a low threshoId of potential harm to a limited number of users. The warning does of course, 
specifically deny that the product is suitable for, or should be used in the genital region. 
The plaintiff victim relied on the recommendation of his physician and the ph>&5an mny or 
may not have been acting reasonably in making the recommendation. While phpicinns 
often recommend products for uses diierent than those for which they arc advertised, the 
clear language on the Nair package suggests that the physician may hnve been negligent. A 
finder of fact may well find that the warning on the Nair package wm adequate and thnt the 
defendant manufacturer should not be strictly liable in tort because n phpician gave a pn- 
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A second warning case, in this instance a diversity action, was 
Berg v. Underwood's Hair Adaption Process, I ~ C , ' ~ ~  The plaintiffs, 
who sustained harm when a medical doctor implanted synthetic 
fibers into their scalps as part of a baldness treatment, sought to 
recover from the manufacturers of the fibers.139 The fibers were 
manufactured for non-medical purposes and were distributed as 
such. The plaintiffs claimed, however, that the fiber manufacturer 
knew of the medical application of their product and failed to warn 
potential victims of possible side effects. The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the fiber manufacturer.140 
Correctly interpreting New York law, the federal bench declined to 
find any duty to warn under these circumstances. The court 
opined: 
Plaintiffs were injured by a bizarre and deliberate abuse by a li- 
censed medical practitioner of a non-medical commercial product. 
In light of the wide availability of the fibers . . . we do not believe 
a New York court would impose liability on these appellees. The 
duty to guard against a potential misuse of a product does not 
extend this far."I 
It is important to note that the manufacturer did not promote 
tient overriding advice. To hold a warning to be adequate as a matter of law will dony an 
injured plaintiff the right to have a jury examine the impact of the warning from tho con- 
sumers' viewpoint. Judges are often less able to assess the product which is the subject of 
litigation in its "real world" environment than a jury. 
Justice Moule expressed concern that the plaintiff read the warning and becamo con- 
cerned. He also noted that to  require a manufacturer to cite every possible harm "would 
pose an unreasonable burden on manufacturers." 102 A.D.2d a t  650, 478 N.Y.S.2d at  380 
(Moule. J., dissenting). Not discussed, but a major argument, for allowing the case to pro- 
ceed before a jury is the question of whether the defendant was aware that its product was 
being recommended by physicians for pre-operative hair removal. Such knowledge might 
well be seen by the jury as leading to a requirement for a stronger or more directed warning. 
The cost of such a warning, as balanced against the harm sought to be prevented, is 
minimal. 
138. 751 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1984). 
139. See id. 
140. See id. a t  137. 
141. Id. Berg may be usefully contrasted with Cooley. See supra notes 127-37 and ac- 
comparying text. The product in Cooley, Nair, was manufactured for direct application to 
the bvdy, and with the defendant-manufacturer's full knowledge that some poople oxpor- 
ienced side effects with its use. The defendant manufacturer in Berg supplied its product for 
use in hairpieces and wigs. To hold the defendant liable because a doctor decided to adapt 
its product is clearly unreasonable. 
Heinonline - -  37 Syracuse L. Rev. 736 1986-1987 
19861 Torts 737 
its product for medical use.142 Where a manufacturer does so pro- 
mote a product, the duty to warn may well be found to exist even 
where the application is a striking, even bizarre, departure from 
accepted medical procedure. 
While the majority of product liability scenarios do not dis- 
close moral, as opposed to legal, culpability on the part of the de- 
fendant, Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co.,lJS decided by the 
Third Department, does. The majority permitted the maintenance 
of a common law fraud cause of action where the plaintiff alleged 
that the defendant not only manufactured a defective and danger- 
ous product, but willfully withheld material facts from consumers 
while lying to the Consumer Product Safety Com~nission."~ Plain- 
tiff"~ husband was killed in an explosion caused by an allegedly 
defective propane gas water heater control valvePO 
Although punitive damages could not be recovered in 
the availability of a fraud cause of action increases the 
likelihood that punitive damages wil l  be awarded in certain prod- 
ucts liability actions. A finding of fraud also has potentially serious 
ramifications for a defendant, and thus it  is a cause of action that, 
in limited and appropriate circumstances, may advance the policy 
objectives of products liability law. 
B. Dram Shop 
With the campaign against drunken driving intensifying, the 
application of the Dram Shop ActxJ7 becomes an even more useN 
tool than it has been in the past. Vendors of intoxicating spirits 
continually seek to limit their liability under the Act. 
In Smith v. G ~ l i , ' ~ ~  the Fourth Department applied the ex- 
isting principle that Dram Shop Act liability for compensatory 
damages can be spread among multiple tortfeasors through contri- 
142. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text. 
143. 104 A.D.2d 84,481 N.Y.S.2d 891 (3d Dep't 1984). 
144. See id. at 85,481 N.Y.S.2d at 893. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. at 88, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 895. "Because at the time of decendent's death 
herein punitive damages were unavailable in a wrongful death action, it n e c d y  follo~;e 
that such damages are inaccessible to the widow." Id. Punitive damages nre now recovernble 
in New York wrongful death actions. 
147. N.Y GEN. OBLIG. LAW 33 11-100,ll-101 (hIcKinney 1983 & Supp. 1986). 
148. 106 A.D.2d 120,484 N.Y.S.2d 740 (4th Dep't 1985). 
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bution.14@ While the Fourth Department's analysis is dictated by 
statute and precedent,lS0 I wonder if the goals of the Dram Shop 
Act might not be met more effectively if contribution was denied. 
In all likelihood, this would require an amendment of the statute. 
In another opinion from the Fourth Department, Bartlelett v. 
Grande,161 the court rejected a vendor's attempt to secure contri- 
bution from a deceased vendee's estate.lS2 "To permit the vendors 
to seek contribution from the estate of the vendee when it is the 
vendee's dependents who are seeking recovery, would diminish the 
plaintiffs' potential recovery and allow the vendor to reduce liabil- 
ity s~bstantially."'~~ The Fourth Department recognized that such 
a step would frustrate an important public policy.lG4 
A. Privacy and Publicity 
In the absence of a common law right of privacy, most litiga- 
tion in New York State alleging what amounts to tortious invasion 
of privacy is brought under section 51 of the Civil Rights Law,loo 
around which a considerable body of case law has developed. The 
most significant section 51 case of the Survey year is Stephano v. 
News Group Publications, ~ n c . , ~ ~ h a n i m o u s l ~  decided by the 
Court of Appeals. The plaintiff, working as a professional model, 
posed for several photographs in which he modeled a new jacket 
for men. He alleged that he agreed to commercial use of the photo- 
graph for one advertisement only.lb7 The photographs were subse- 
149. See id. a t  122,484 N.Y.S.2d a t  742 (citing N.Y. CPLR 1401; Wood v. City of Now 
York, 39 A.D.2d 534,330 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1st Dep't 1972); Anderson v. Comnrdo, 107 Misc. 2d 
821,436 N.Y.S.2d 669 (Sup. C t ,  Livingston Co. 1981)). Exemplary damages nwnrded pursu- 
ant to the Dram Shop Act are not, however, subject to contribution. See Smith, 106 A.D.2d 
a t  122, 484 N.Y.S.2d a t  742 (citing Mitchell v. The Shoals, Inc., 48 Misc. 2d 381, 264 
N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1965), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 338, 227 N.E.2d 21, 280 N.Y.S.2d 
113 (1967)). 
150. See N.Y. CPLR 1401 (McKinney 1976); Wood v. City of New York, 39 A.D.2d 634, 
330 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1972); Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 
N.Y.S.2d 383 (1972). 
151. 103 A.D.2d 671, 481 N.Y.S.2d 566 (4th Dep't 1984). 
152. See id. a t  672, 481 N.Y.S.2d a t  566. 
153. See id. a t  672, 481 N.Y.S.2d a t  567. 
154. See id. a t  673,481 N.Y.S.2d a t  567. 
155. N.Y. CN. RIGHTS LAW 8 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1986). 
156. 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984). 
157. See id. a t  180, 474 N.E.2d a t  580, 485 N.Y.S.2d a t  221. 
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quently published in several issues of New York magazine in what 
can be described as consumer news columns. Price and availability 
of the modeled jacket were given, but no advertiser paid for the 
feature.lS8 
The plaintiff brought a section 51 claim. The trial court 
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment while the 
appellate division reversed.1s9 The state's highest court reversed 
the appellate division.lBO Part of the plaintWs claim hinged upon 
his contention that the defendant sought additional or new adver- 
tising revenue through use of the column which featured photos of 
him.161 The Court of Appeals rejected this theory. The Court 
noted: 
The newsworthiness exception [to section 511 applies not only to 
reports of political happenings and social trends . . . but also to 
news stories and articles of consumer interest including develop- 
ments in the fashion world . . . [Tlhe event or matter of public 
interest which the defendant seeks to convey is not the model's 
performance, but the availability of the clothing items 
displayed.ls2 
The Court of Appeals provides a good discussion of the con- 
temporary policy purposes of section 51 in Stephano. Perhaps be- 
cause of the absence of a common law remedy for invasion of pri- 
vacy, section 51 has acquired a degree of creative interest i t  would 
otherwise lack. The Court of Appeals has been sensitive to 
preventing inroads which, by classifying activity as commercial and 
for purposes of trade and advertising, would threaten first amend- 
ment rights and propel section 51 litigation into the Supreme 
Court. 
158. See id. a t  179,474 N.E.2d at 582,485 N.Y.S.2d a t  220-21. 
159. See id. at 187,474 N.E.2d at 586,485 N.Y.S.2d a t  227. 
160. See id. a t  185,474 N.E.2d at 583, 485 N.Y.S.2d a t  225. 
161. See id. 
162. Id. a t  184,474 N.E.2d a t  582-83.485 N.Y.S.2d a t  225. The Court nlso noted: 
The fact that the defendant may have included this item in its columns solely or 
primarily to increase the circulation of its magazine and therefore its profits . . . 
does not mean that the defendant has used the plaintill's picture for trade purposes 
within the meaning of the statute. Indeed, most publications seek to increme their 
circulation and also their profits. It is the content of the article and not the defend- 
- ant's motive or primary motive to increase circulation which determines whether it  
is a newsworthy item, as opposed to a trade usage, under the Civil Rights Law. 
Id. a t  184-85,474 N.E.2d a t  585,485 N.Y.S.2d a t  225. 
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The First Department, in Caesar u. Chemical Bank,lo3 af- 
firmed the trial court determination which certified as a class bank 
employees who alleged commercial unauthorized use of their pho- 
tographs by the defendant bank.ls4 The court also affirmed, some- 
what reluctantly, the longstanding mandate of section 51 that con- 
sent must be in writing and that oral consent goes only to the 
matter of damages but not to 1iability.le6 The majority invited leg- 
islative intervention to permit oral consent,1oe while the dissenting 
justices found the requirement for a written consent to be a bolster 
for a "technically meaningless claim."ls7 The dissent argued that 
the fact that the pictures were posed indicates consent.loe This 
makes no sense since the stated reason for photographing employ- 
ees may have nothing to do with the eventual use to which the 
photos are put. 
The interrelationship of the federal Constitution and section 
51 is well illustrated in Lerman u. Flynt Distributing Co.loD The 
plaintiff in Lerman brought her action in the United States Dis- 
trict Court for the Southern District of New York after learning 
that she had been incorrectly identified in defendant's publication 
as having appeared nude in a movie role.170 The publication fea- 
tured photos of a nude actress, allegedly, but not actually, the 
plaintiff.171 The plaintiff had never appeared nude in a film.17a 
In the district court, the plaintiff secured an award of ten mil- 
lion dollars.17s The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.174 
While sympathy for the plaintiff is not hard to find, the appellate 
court correctly analyzed section 51 law and found that the plaintiff 
was not able to successfully maintain her claim. The federal ap- 
peals court found that the article in question was not an advertise- 
ment but a story about a matter of some, if not general, public 
163. 106 A.D.2d 353, 483 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1st Dep't 1984). 
164. See id. 
165. See id. at 353, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 17-18. 
166. See id. 
167. See id. at 353, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 18 (Kupferman, J., dissenting). 
168. See id. at 354, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 17-18 (Kupferman, J., dissenting). 
169. 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984). 
170. See id. at 127. 
171. See id. 
172. See id. 
173. See id. at 128. 
174. See id. at 142. 
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interest.176 The plaintifPs strongest claim to section 51 protection 
rested under an interpretation of that statute whereby even a news 
article may result in liability if the person depicted without con- 
sent bore no reasonable relationship to the subject of the arti~1e.l'~ 
Here the plaintiff was the author of both the book and the screen 
script of the movie which was the subject of the arti~1e.l'~ She was, 
within the meaning of the first amendment, a limited purpose pub- 
lic figure and, as such, she failed to meet the substantially higher 
burden placed on such figures in order for them to prevail in ac- 
tions against media defendants.17s 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals made a regrettable ob- 
servation, which is extraneous to the issues decided and is proba- 
bly incorrect: 
Finally, we note that reputational damage to Ms. Lerman could 
not have been great. Only the readers of Adelina, a magazine of 
relatively modest circulation that Ms. Lerman describes as "sor- 
did" and "obscene" would have seen the offending material. In 
fact, given the number of famous persons portrayed in this fash- 
ion, one wonders whether such pictures are even capable of pro- 
ducing genuine reputational harm.170 
Whether such pictures produce harm depends on many factors, all 
of which are, in a properly alleged and valid action, questions for 
the finder of fact. It is unlikely that any of the justices of the ap- 
pellate court would be amused to be misidentified in nude photos 
in Adelina. Of equal importance is the established concept that 
harm to reputational interests may not be manifested for some 
time after publication. Premature pronouncements by jurists on 
the possibility of harm are unrealistic and unfair. Finally, section 
51 does not require reputational harm. Indeed, case law reflects 
many instances where reputations may have been enhanced by un- 
lawful misappropriation of a person's likeness. Reputational harm 
is relevant to damages, but not to liability. 
The lack of a reasonable relationship between the illustrations 
used in a news article and the alleged identified subjects in the 
illustration as a basis for section 51 liability was highlighted in 
175. See id. at 130. 
176. See id. at 137. 
177. See id. at 132. 
178. See id. at 142. 
179. Id. at 141. 
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Quezada by De Lamota u. Daily News.180 The infant plaintiffs 
were, allegedly, identifiable in a drawing which accompanied a 
news story on juvenile drug use.18' There was no issue that the 
plaintiffs were not meant to be implicated in drug trafficking. The 
artist supposedly used a photograph of the juveniles in executing 
the commissioned drawing.le2 The court, in denying that part of 
the defendant's summary judgment motion which sought to elimi- 
nate the section 51 cause of action, noted that the issue of whether 
the plaintiffs could be identified from the drawing was one of 
fact.18= However, if they were identifiable, their admitted lack of 
association with the subject of the article would result in 
liability.'84 
The continuing lesson of cases such as Quezada is that the 
media must use the utmost care in utilizing photographs and draw- 
ings as illustrations for what are clearly news articles. An increas- 
ing number of section 51 cases focus on this area of liability, where 
past case law focused mostly on advertisements. 
B. Libel and Slander 
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the First Depart- 
ment in Gaeta v. New York News, Inc.,IBs .thus dismissing a libel 
action brought by the former wife of a patient in a state mental 
health facility. The defendant newspaper had investigated condi- 
tions in the state mental health system and reported its conclu- 
sions in a series of articles.le6 An article detailed the experiences of 
the plaintiff and stated that she allegedly had affairs during her 
marriage to the patient, her infidelity supposedly contributing to 
his mental problems.187 
Judge Kaye, writing for a unanimous court, noted that "[tlhis 
libel action, brought by a nonpublic figure against a newspaper 
publisher and reporter, tests the reach of Chapadeau u. Utica Ob- 
180. 125 Misc. 2d 302, 479 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1984). 
181. See id. at 302, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 683. 
182. See id. at 302-03, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 683. 
183. See id. 
184. See id. 
185. 62 N.Y.2d 340, 465 N.E.2d 802, 477 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1984). 
186. See id. at 346,465 N.E.2d at 803,477 N.Y.S.2d at 83. The articles were pnrt of an 
investigative reporting project. 
187. See id. at 346,465 N.E.2d at 803-04,477 N.Y.S.2d at 83-84. 
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server-Di~patch."~~ Chapadeau is a major Court of Appeals deci- 
sion which holds that a plaintiff in a libel action must demonstrate 
gross irresponsibility on the part of the defendant if the article 
concerned is a matter of legitimate public concern.18e 
The Gaeta plaints  maintained that no such concern could 
embrace references to her in a news article and that a simple negli- 
gence standard was appropriate for determining liability.leO The 
Court of Appeals disagreed and found that Chapadeau was con- 
trolling.lel The state's highest court also found that the plaintiff 
had not alleged any conduct on the part of the defendants which 
could be construed by a jury as constituting gross irresponsibility 
and thus dismissed the action.lB2 
There is nothing new in Gaeta, but the Court of Appeals took 
the opportunity to clearly re-state the policy and rationale of 
Chapadeau, perhaps in the hope of providing guidance in this dif- 
ficult area.lS3 
A former Schenectady mayor witnessed the dismissal of his li- 
bel action against a local newspaper in Duci u. Daily Gazette Co.le( 
The Third Department reversed the trial court's denial of the de- 
fendant's motion to dismiss.196 A teenaged lifeguard had been 
quoted in a news report of a drowning that the Mayor had just 
stood around laughing and talking while futile rescue efforts were 
undertaken.lS8 The appellate court found the former Mayor's com- 
188. Id. 
189. See 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975). In Chapadeau, the 
appellant was arrested and charged with criminal possession of n hypodermic instrument, 
and criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the fourth degree. The respondent's newspa- 
per reported the appellant's arrest, and also stated that the appellant wos part of a group or 
party where drugs and beer were present when he was arrested. The nppellant clnimed that 
these latter statements libeled hi. The newspaper admitted the f&ity of the lntter state- 
ments, but contended that the article, when viewed in its entirety, wos fair and nmuate. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the newspaper, holding that 
there needs to be grossly irresponsible conduct for liability. In this case, the Court found 
that the newspaper exercised reasonable methods to insure accuracy. 
190. See Gaeta, 62 N.Y.2d a t  346,465 N.E.2d a t  803,477 N.YS.2d nt 83. 
191. See id. a t  350,465 N.E.2d a t  806,477 N.Y.S.2d a t  86. 
192. See id. 
193. During the Survey year, the Fit Department considered libel issues involving the 
interpretation and application of Chapadeau. See Ortiz v. Valdescnstilln, 102 kD.2d 513, 
478 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1st Dep't 1984). While essentially a fact-sensitive aw, the discusion of 
the majority in Ortiz usefully compliments Gaeta. 
194. 102 A.D.2d 940,477 N.Y.S.2d 760 (3d Dep't 1984). 
195. See id. a t  941,477 N.Y.S.2d a t  762. 
196. See id. a t  940.477 N.Y.S.2d a t  761. 
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plaint defective on two theories. First, he failed to show that the 
words quoted, in an article concerning a matter of public concern, 
were susceptible of the defamatory meaning which the plaintiff 
ascribed to them.le7 Second, since he alleged only one act of sup- 
posed defamation against the defendant, he was bound to show 
special damages, which he did not do.lD8 
"Death is an honorable estate, so that no one is demeaned or 
belittled by the report of his or her death."lDO So noted Justice 
Greenfield in dismissing an action brought by a non-dead plaintiff 
and his parents.200 Plaintiff David Rubinstein saw an obituary no- 
tice about himself in both the New York Daily News and the New 
York Post, neither of which was aware that he was, in fact, alivee201 
He claimed severe physical and emotional trauma and an inability 
to work. Not to be outdone, his parents sued for their own psychic 
anguish in addition to claiming mutual loss of consortium.202 
Justice Greenfield stated that the plaintiffs' action did not 
sound in libel, a reality which the plaintiffs themselves acknowl- 
edged.203 The jurist's well-written opinion briefly reviews the real 
basis for asserting this action, a variation on the infliction of 
mental distress theme.204 The justice's review of New York law led 
him to find that merely being incorrectly reported as dead does 
not, by itself, fit into any recognized cause of action.200 
C. Miscellaneous Intentional Torts 
In Moye v. Gary,206 United States District Judge Sweet dis- 
missed a complaint by the pro se plaintiff, who alleged intentional 
infliction of mental distress by her supervisor.207 Both were federal 
employees at the time of the action. Judge Sweet noted that the 
conduct of the defendant, even if it had actually occurred, at most 
197. See id. at 940,477 N.Y.S.2d at 762. 
198. See id. at 941, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 762. 
199. Rubinstein v. New York Post Corp., 128 Misc. 2d 1,3,488 N.Y.S.2d 331,332 (Sup. 
Ct. N.Y. Co. 1985). 
200. See id. at 6, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 335. 
201. See id. at 2, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 332. 
202. See id. 
203. See id. at 3, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 333. 
204. See id. at 4-6, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 333-35. 
205. See id. at 6, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 335. 
206. 595 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
207. See id. at 739. 
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constituted insults and indignities which New York law excludes 
from the concept of intentional infliction of mental distress.208 
A troublesome case involving an allegation of false imprison- 
ment against the State of New York was decided incorrectly by the 
Second Department. In Gonzalez v. State,loB the appellate panel 
overturned a Court of Claims judgment for the claimant. The 
claimant had been found by a New York City transit police officer 
on subway tracks and, after being removed from the tracks, was 
taken first to Kings County Hospital and then to Kingsboro, a 
state psychiatric facility.210 He was held for observation for about 
two days before being discharged. The appellate court majority 
found that the forced hospitalization was privileged, based upon its 
review of the record.211 
Justice Mangano, in dissent, acknowledged that the facts in 
the record were susceptible to several  interpretation^."'^ He as- 
serted, however, that "there was ample evidence in the record to 
support the holding of the Court of Claims."21s He also noted the 
findings of an admitting psychiatrist who found no evidence of 
psychosis on the morning of the subway incident.l14 
The willingness of an appellate court to search a trial record in 
order to arrive a t  a new factual determination favorable to the 
State of New York is unfortunate in itself. Even more regretable is 
the fact that the appellate court majority reversed a false impris- 
onment judgment for a plaintiff in an action involving the mental 
health system. Even with increased safeguards, both substantive 
and procedural, the deck is largely stacked against a person con- 
fined for observation. The reports of police officers, the preconcep- 
tions of hospital staff, and the reality that such persons often are 
not quite in top form are generally factors that combine to sway a 
court to find against a claim of false imprisonment. Perhaps this is 
inevitable and largely unavoidable. When a court does find, how- 
ever, that a person had been illegally held, an appellate court 
should exercise the greatest reluctance to interfere with that find- 
208. See id. at 740. 
209. 110 A.D.2d 810,488 N.Y.S.2d 231 (2d Dep't 1985). 
210. See id. at 812, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 232. 
211. See id. at 812, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 233. 
212. See id. at 814, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 234 (hlangano, J., dissenting). 
213. See id. 
214. See id. 
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ing. Public policy demands that mental health officers understand 
the concept of false imprisonment and care about avoiding its com- 
mission. Gonzalez does nothing to further that goal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Well-funded advertising campaigns are attempting to convince 
the New York public that common law tort remedies are a burden 
society cannot afford. Counter-campaigns invoke the image of 
greedy insurance companies, incompetent physicians and helpless 
consumers who are the victims of the shoddy and the dishonest 
and who have only the law of tort to look for recovery of damages. 
The rhetoric is extreme and the solutions proposed are often dra- 
conian. No system is perfect and some change is not only to be 
expected, but to be welcomed. The vitality of the common law and 
its ability to adapt to changing circumstances must not be over- 
looked or hastily rejected because of special interests whether they 
be from the plaintiffs' or the defendants' territory. Municipal tort 
liability is an even more pressing problem than medical malprac- 
tice. Mass disaster tort cases threaten the economic viability of na- 
tional resources, often with national defense implications. 
Whatever the route taken by New York legislatures, both judges 
and legal practitioners share a duty to uphold the rich heritage of 
the common law. 
A number of important state and local government liability 
cases are expected to be decided during the coming Survey year. 
Judicial scrutiny of damage awards, on the increase over the past 
few years, will continue. These and other developments will be an- 
alyzed in the next annual Survey article. 
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